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In Uganda, the unemployment rate is already a staggering 9.4 percent among the 
whole population and among young people even higher, 19.4 percent. This factor, 
combined with low wages, creates pressure to get some extra income. It has led 
employees to misappropriate assets from their workplaces. In addition, the culture 
of impunity and corruption makes it clear that fraud is a serious issue. 
Global research shows that fraud is common at academic institutions, such as uni-
versities. Fraud in a university environment differs from business fraud. There are 
no published reports on losses caused by fraud in organizations in Uganda. How-
ever, for instance, in the US, approximately 5 percent of companies’ turnover is lost 
to fraud annually. 
The purpose of this thesis was to help an academic institution create a fraud risk 
strategy through fraud risk assessment. The thesis was made for a commercialized 
university in Uganda. The objective was to provide information about fraud and then 
find ways to prevent and detect possible frauds. 
The framework deals with the definition of fraud profoundly. Uganda’s national econ-
omy is described to justify the need for more effective fraud prevention. This thesis 
explains why fraud occurs and then presents ways to mitigate the risk. Detection of 
fraud is also discussed, so that the organization can operate more efficiently. One 
chapter is dedicated to discussion on the issue of how to deal with a suspected case 
of fraud. Different organization members were interviewed to get more information 
about the situation at the university. 
The empirical study shows that because the university is still quite young, proper 
resources have not been put to place for fraud risk management. The fact that dif-
ferent organization members had disparate information indicates that there is a lack 
of communication. Fraud is not common at this university, which is surprising due 
to the fact that previous research claims that fraud is more common at commercial-
ized universities. The thesis writer suggests that the university should start imple-
menting risk assessment and, through that, create a fraud risk strategy.  
Keywords: fraud, misappropriation, corruption, internal control, university 
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Ugandassa työttömyys on huomattavan korkea, 9,4 %, ja nuorisotyöttömyys vielä-
kin korkeampi, 19,4 %. Yhdistyneenä alhaiseen palkkatasoon tämä luo paineita li-
sätienestien etsimiseen. Se on saanut jotkut työntekijät kavaltamaan niiden organi-
saatioiden varoja, joiden palveluksessa he työskentelevät. Lisäksi rankaisematto-
muuden kulttuuri ja korruptio korostavat entisestään petosten olevan maassa suuri 
ongelma. 
Kansainväliset tutkimukset osoittavat, että petos on yleistä akateemisissa instituuti-
oissa, kuten yliopistoissa. Yliopistoissa tapahtuvissa petostapauksissa on eroja yri-
tyspetoksiin nähden. Ugandassa ei ole julkaistu tutkimuksia organisaatioiden petok-
sien takia menettämistä varoista. Muun muassa Yhdysvalloissa liikevaihdosta me-
netetään vuosittain 5 prosenttia petoksiin. 
Tämän opinnäytteen tarkoitus on auttaa akateemista instituutiota luomaan petosris-
kistrategia petosriskiarvioinnin kautta. Tämä työ on tehty ugandalaiselle kaupalli-
selle yliopistolle. Tavoitteena on tarjota tietoa petoksista ja löytää sen kautta keinoja 
petoksien ehkäisyyn ja havaitsemiseen. 
Viitekehyksessä käydään läpi, mitä petoksella tarkoitetaan, ja siihen liittyvä termi-
nologia. Ugandan kansantaloutta esitellään tehokkaamman petosten torjunnan tar-
peen perustelemiseksi. Opinnäytteessä käydään läpi syitä petoksille ja annetaan 
keinoja niiden vähentämiselle. Myös petosten havaitsemiseksi annetaan keinoja, 
jotta organisaatio voisi toimia tehokkaammin. Viimeinen osio sisältää pohdintaa 
siitä, kuinka mahdollisesti havaittua petosta tulisi käsitellä. Instituution jäseniä haas-
tateltiin, jotta saataisiin lisää tietoa tilanteesta yliopistossa. 
Resursseja ei ole yliopistossa vielä kunnolla kohdistettu petosten riskinhallintaan. 
Organisaation eri edustajien eriävät mielipiteet osoittavat, että yhteisössä esiintyy 
kommunikaation puutetta. Petos ei ole yleinen ongelma yliopistossa tällä hetkellä, 
mikä on yllättävää, koska aiemmat tutkimuslöydökset väittävät petoksien olevan 
yleisempiä kaupallisissa kuin valtion omistamissa yliopistoissa. Opinnäytteen tekijä 
suosittelee, että yliopisto aloittaisi riskien arvioinnin ja loisi sen kautta petosriskistra-
tegian. 
 Avainsanat: petos, kavallus, korruptio, sisäinen valvonta, yliopisto 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis was made for a university in Uganda. It seeks ways to prevent fraud from 
happening in the organization and to get guidelines on how to uncover possible 
frauds. The guideline should help the organization to plan a personal strategy for 
themselves to start operating more effectively and efficiently. 
1.1 Objective 
The amount of corruption and fraud is very high among Ugandan organizations 
which affects the wellbeing of the whole nation, because these assets that disappear 
will have a straight impact on tax revenues. Also, the organization itself will have 
lack in performance, finances and the overall welfare of the work community. 
A statistical abstract from 2015 shows that in Uganda the unemployment rate is high 
(9.4 % in 2013) especially among the youth (19.7 % in 2013) and salaries are ex-
tremely low. Average salary is around 110 000 UGX which equals 29 euros per 
month (Statistical abstract 2015). That has led the people to try to find ways to get 
“bit on the side” income. This means employees are driven to seek ways to misap-
propriate assets from the organizations they work in. It is not seen morally as bad 
as theft from some individual. Also, the management of the company might be cor-
rupted, because they can easily work together with the accountants or the officials. 
This means the transparency of organizations in Uganda is low. 
Ramage (2005) talks about morality and fraud. Morality depends on tradition. Think-
ing that “small theft” will not have a larger impact helps also to make it more morally 
acceptable. If organization is not transparent it creates an opportunity for misappro-
priation. Need for reaching the high targets of employers, which can give you bo-
nuses, will create the need to for instance forge sales numbers. 
The need for fraud risk management in Ugandan academic institutions is high be-
cause of the economic situation, explained later on in the report. This thesis talks 
mainly about two forms of fraud, which are corruption (bribery) and misappropria-
tion. Third form is financial statement fraud, but it is not included in the research. In 
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this thesis, the economic background and the impact of corruption in Ugandan or-
ganization will be illustrated. Fraud is also explained in a global scale. After that, 
guidelines will be presented on how to prevent fraud from happening in the organi-
zation and how to detect possible fraud. This will help the organization to create 
clear fraud risk strategy, that provides instructions for the internal control. 
1.2 Subject matter 
To prove that somebody actually committed fraud instead of just making a mistake, 
it is important to define the meaning of fraud in legal perspective (Kovacich 2008, 
28). He says fraud is: 
“A concealment or false representation through a statement or conduct 
that injures another who relies on it in acting.” 
Kovacich (2008, 28) writes that “intent” must be proven and that is what divides 
fraud from misstatement. Access to organization’s assets is another factor that por-
trays fraud (p.32). Asset is something that is owned and has value. Vona (2008, 5) 
argues that the point of fraud is to conceal intentionally the true nature of a business 
transaction. 
Kovavich (2008, 29) continues that there are three elements which constructs fraud. 
They are fraud in fact, positive fraud and moral fraud. Fraud in fact means that a 
person does a transaction because of mispresentation, for instance cheque fraud. 
Positive fraud is an act that looks like it is done with a good intention but actually the 
purpose is to deceive. Moral fraud is still a deception but the nature of it is moral, to 
give a simple example “Robin Hood”. The person committing fraud can be called 
fraudster, defrauder or fraud feasor (p. 31). Fraudulent act involves bad faith, dis-
honesty, a lack of integrity or wickedness. 
Stewart [referenced 27.11.2016] says fraud is a practical result by false pretense. It 
is indicated as crime of dishonest conduct by a person. By misleading or taking 
advantage of a person, a human being or an organization, to do harm that creates 
financial damage to the other person. 
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Fraud can be divided into three groups: asset misappropriation, corruption and 
fraudulent financial statement (Biegelman & Bartow 2006, 27).  Misappropriation 
schemes are the most common forms of fraud, but globally the median losses these 
schemes create is the lowest (93 000 $). The occurrence of fraudulent financial 
schemes globally was the lowest among the three fraud types but the median losses 
it creates was the highest (1 000 000 $).  
Gee (2012, 3) researched fraud schemes in the U.S. and counted that misappropri-
ation was the most common fraud (83 percent) with median loss of 120 000 $. Fi-
nancial statement fraud happened only in 8 percent of the cases, but the median 
losses were the highest, similar to Biegelman and Bartow, 1 000 000 $. Corruption 
was involved in one-third of the cases with the median loss of 250 000 $. 
This thesis will be mostly focusing on misappropriation and corruption in the forms 
of embezzlement of assets and bribery. 
1.3 Previous research 
There was not found any research published about this issue in Uganda. Instead 
only one research was found from UK, but it focuses only on the issues of British 
universities. This study was made by Stone and Starkey in 2011 and it was called 
“The possible impact of university corruption on customers’ ethical standards”. The 
research brought in to the light an issue of corrupt behavior of students and the 
impact it will have in their future. 
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2 THEORY AND BACKGROUND 
This section goes through previous studies on the issue of fraud. It includes the 
country economics of Uganda and the terminology related to fraud. After that the 
process of fraud risk management is presented in detail. 
2.1 The republic of Uganda 
This chapter focuses on the economics and politics to give an image of the situation 
in Uganda. In long term the economy has been developing. Political situation has 
been stable since the 1980s. 
2.1.1 Country economics 
Uganda’s economic growth rate has gone down to 3.9 % in the first half of the year 
2016 (Jacques 2016). That followed from a firm 5.4 % increase in 2015. Reason for 
this was weakened performance of the agricultural sector. On the other hand, ser-
vice and industrial sectors performed strongly and added value approximately 5.6 
%. 
Pressure from external sources has reduced because of significant decline in im-
ports (20 %) and growth of exports (0.7 %) (Jacques 2016). This has led to account 
deficit decreasing 29 %, which means 594 million US dollars in H1 2016. It gives 
greater stability for the Ugandan shilling. 
As a result of easing external headwings and added vigorous monetary policies, 
headline inflation is down at 4.2 % and core inflation at 4.1 % in September (Jacques 
2016). Gross domestic product is still predicted to be 5.1 % for the current year. It 
is led by agricultural sector regaining its efficiency on the second half of the year. 
For the year 2017 it is expected that the growth will rise up to 5.8 % and in the years 
2018–2020 it will rise above 6 % (Jacques 2016). This development is due to hy-
drocarbon sectors steps forward in export. 
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However, it is hard to tell if the hydrocarbon sector will bring the wanted growth. 
Patey (2015) explains in his report that most of the oil wells which were found are 
already sold to foreign investors and many of the oil wells are geographically located 
in national parks and other protected areas. As a result of drilling the oil, it would 
impact negatively the tourism industry and most of the profits from the oil will flow to 
foreign investors. Also, the value of crude oil has been low for a long time and since 
Uganda would only participate primary production, that would again indicate low 
proceeds. Third reason is that globally researchers are seeking other options for 
source of energy than oil, which can lead to low demand in the future. What also 
should be noticed is that Ugandans have also divided into two groups in this issue. 
Kanabahita (2001) mentions in his report that the time when rain forests were being 
cut down in an alarming paste all over the world, Ugandan government also decided 
to sell the ownerships of most of the forests to foreign investors. This led to total 
deforestation. After that the regeneration of the forest was not implemented (op. 
cit.). This same scenario could happen with the oil wells.  
2.1.2 Policy and politics 
As a result of adopting International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank policies 
in the 1980s, Uganda has brought up producer incentives and improved resource 
allocation and mobilization in the public sector (Jacques 2016). Economic policy in 
Uganda is guided by a new National Development plan NDP that was introduced in 
June 2015. Uganda has remained stable from the political view. This is due to Pres-
ident Yoweri Museveni maintaining firm grip on politics. Though it is necessary to 
keep in mind possible tensions arising from his succession and changes made in to 
the constitution for his advantage to remain in power for longer. 
2.2 Fraud in nonprofit organizations 
In America Holfreter (2008) found out through her survey that it was far more likely 
that a woman would embezzle NPO’s funds but male fraudsters created higher 
losses. She profiled offenders among other things by their age, gender, academic 
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background and position in the entity. NPO’s rely on public trust which makes them 
have far more to lose for fraud, because the image includes strong ethics.  
The objective of Holfreter’s (2008) research was to collect perpetrator-, victim char-
acteristics and the median losses from the offense. She also wanted to prove if 
tightened internal control reduces the losses for fraud. 
The study of Holfreter (2008) indicated that female fraudsters have less education, 
lower status in the organization and limited access to commit fraud. For men the 
profile was more “white-collar”. There was a straight link with the amount lost with 
the educational level of the defrauder. High academic background meant higher 
losses. The same goes with the position in the entity. To be noticed was that the it 
was less likely that a management member would carry out fraud, but the amount 
embezzled was higher than from an employee fraud case. The median age of a 
fraudster was middle-aged (43 years). 
The victim characteristics of Holfreter’s (2008) founding’s were surprisingly that 
smaller organizations had more fraud losses compared to the bigger organizations 
per worker. Total losses were higher for larger entities. There was found to be a link 
between improved controls and reduced fraud losses. Again it was emphasized that 
the strict controls of employing new workers was the key in reducing fraud. Also 
anonymous reporting clearly mitigated fraud losses.  
 
Simmon-Brown (2016) gives examples for fraudsters who embezzle public funds. 
She theorizes that donations which are given to these organizations, create temp-
tations among people who for instance, have financial issues and access to the 
organizations accounts. She says that these people lack in remorse and mercy 
which is hard for others to understand and suspect in organizations like universities 
that provide goodwill services. It is hard to believe that a person who has worked a 
long time for the entity could do this kind of immoral act. Below are two cases 
whereby creed was the driver to commit fraud and the nonprofit organization lacked 
in separation of duties. What helped the organizations to catch the wrongdoers were 
tight internal control. 
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In Simmon-Browns (2016) example the fraudster had worked for the company 22 
years and started a cheque scheme. First it was with handling the organizations own 
expenditures. The fraudster had total control over the cheque account so she was 
the one writing the cheques as well as receiving cash. The other way was to demand 
extra payments from the customers for the organization but in reality, the cash went 
to her account. This was made easy because there was complete and sincere trust 
towards the fraudster by the employer and the customers. Luckily the organization 
started to notice these transactions that differed from the normal operation. To catch 
the wrongdoer the organization had to make an external audit which included re-
views on the bookkeeping and documents and even personnel interviews. Finally 
they were able to catch the fraudster. 
Another case Simmon-Brown had come across was an apartment manager who 
was able to cheat the company by altering ledger to show that some apartments 
were empty when in reality people were living there. The fraudster received the rents 
to her own personal cheque account or in cash. To hide the trails, she did not train 
her subordinate to the bookkeeping, as she was asked to do by the management, 
so she was the only one managing the accounts. Management started to suspect 
her through her behavior of taking sick leave and not showing to her managerial-
reviews. They saw that there was too many evictions in the building. When they 
confronted her, she just promised to look into it but instead she never came back to 
the office again. 
2.3 Forms of common frauds in Uganda 
Most common frauds in Ugandan organizations are cheque frauds, which can be 
made in four ways: counterfeit, forge, alter and draw on closed account (Fraud & 
Anti money laundering [Referenced 29.11.2016]). Still a rare way is credit and debit 
card frauds, because payments are still made mostly with cheques and cash. One 
possible way is a deposit slip scam, whereby a person writes a deposit slip which is 
valueless. Another tactic is the exploitation of assets. The charitable publications 
scams are committed mainly the same way as in corporations (Greenlee et. al. 
2007). Other forms of fraudulent acts are receipt fraud and false accounting (Fraud 
14 
 
 
& Anti money laundering [Referenced 29.11.2016]). Lastly it has been seen in 
Uganda that the use of ghost workers is increasing (Rumney 2016). Adding ghost 
workers is explained as an act whereby payroll clerk adds on the list of employees, 
workers who do not exist. After that the clerk starts to make salary payments to 
him/herself in cash or straight to his/her personal account. 
2.4 Occupational fraud 
Gee (2012, 2) talks about the deception that is committed by organization members, 
which is occupational fraud. It can be as little as using entity’s phone to make per-
sonal phone calls and taking office supplies. Lacking in expected work performance, 
like taking sick leave when actually the employee is not sick or underperform inten-
tionally. Gee sees this as an abuse of the permissions given to the employee. Look-
ing at these cases it is clear that the fraud elements (intent, dishonesty, asset being 
defraud) can be indicated although they are in a mild form. He says it is left to the 
organization to choose how to approach these minor offenses, through considera-
tion on the size of the financial impact. 
2.5 Fraudulent financial statements 
Deliberate misrepresentation, misstatement or omission of financial statement data 
are indicated as financial statement fraud (Biegelman and Bartow 2006, 27). The 
most known form is “cooking the books”. The purpose of the act is to mislead the 
reader and create flawed impression of the organization’s financial strength. Biegel-
man and Bartow (p. 27) explain that fraudulent financial statements include for in-
stance overstated revenues or understated liabilities and expenses. SAS 99 (2002) 
gives guidance for financial statement fraud and it will be presented in the section 
2.11.1. 
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2.6 Misappropriation 
Misappropriation occurs, when a person seizes assets or personal estate, which is 
owned by someone else, but is in his/her possession (Hill & Hill [referenced 
27.11.2016]). Or in another case, when a person uses assets, that are not owned 
by that person, to unauthorized purpose. Biegelman and Bartow (2006, 27) explain 
misappropriation as theft or misuse of an organization’s assets. The difference be-
tween misappropriation and theft is that in misappropriation you already have the 
asset in your possession, while in theft you take the asset from someone. 
There are two types of misappropriations, cash and noncash. Cash misappropria-
tion is still divided into three groups, which are larceny, skimming and fraudulent 
disbursements (Biegelman & Bartow 2006, 166). Larceny means taking money from 
the entity’s accounts. This could happen by simply taking petty cash or making a 
deposit. Skimming is when an organization member for instance unrecords or un-
derstates sales and takes the subtraction to themselves. Fraudulent disbursements 
are any schemes done to the expenditures. These are for instance false refunds, 
billing schemes, payroll schemes and overstating expenses. Again the subtraction 
is taken by the fraudster. 
2.7 Corruption 
Corruption is an act that is done for the intention to provide some advantage that is 
inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others (Bouvier [Referenced 
27.11.2016]). Bribery is the most common form of corruption. The other two are 
kickbacks and bid-rigging. Biegelman and Bartow (2006, 165) indicate that corrup-
tion includes conflicts of interests between employee and employer. 
Bribe is globally a normal business transaction (Biegelman and Bartow 2006, 175). 
It can be put to the books as facilitation fee. The point in giving bribes is to get 
influence. It is the cost of doing some task faster or to get it done in general. What 
makes bribery unethical or even illegal is when it is done hidden from the entity or if 
it includes government official. 
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Kickbacks are paid when for instance organization A overcharges or puts forward a 
bogus invoice for organization B (Biegelman and Bartow 2006, 175). Member in B 
will help the A in this and gets cut on the profits (kickback) for covering the fraud. 
Bid-rigging is when organization A is bidding on a contract with organization B (Bie-
gelman and Bartow 2006, 175). Member from B will help the A to win the contract 
by giving out inside information and through that receives cut on the profits. 
Active bribery is explained by the Anti-Corruption Resource-Centre (U4) [Refer-
enced 29.11.2016] to be the offence committed by the person who promises or gives 
the bribe. The opposite “passive bribery” is the offence done by the person who 
demands or receives the bribe. 
2.7.1 Corruption in Uganda 
Out of 168 countries, Uganda is ranked 139. on Transparency Internationals (TI) list 
by Corruption Perceptions Index. Nordic countries are ranked the least corrupt coun-
tries in the world. Finland is second least corrupt country in the ranking. 
Report of corruption in Uganda done by Business Anti-Corruption Portal (GAN) [Ref-
erenced 29.11.2016] shows that corruption embodies one major challenge for peo-
ple practicing trade. The risk of corruption is high among the police, the judiciary 
and procurement. Under-the-table cash payments are assumed to be received while 
performing a service. 
Uganda’s legal framework against corruption composes from the Anti-Corruption 
Act 2009, the Penal Code, the Inspectorate of Government Act 2002, the Public 
Finance and Accountability Act 2003 (PFAA) and the Leadership Code Act 2002 
(LCA) [Referenced 29.11.2016]. These regulations provide instruments to deal with 
embezzlement, exploitation of office and fraud. They also develop transparency and 
the fight against corruption. Criminalization of attempted corruption, bribery, black-
mail, bribery of a foreign public official and abuse of office is done by the LCA. 
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Gifts and donations must be declared under the LCA if their value exceeds five cur-
rency points [Referenced 29.11.2016]). One currency point is 20 000 Ugandan shil-
lings. In euros this means 26.31 €. 
The challenges that corruption creates aggravates because of weak law enforce-
ment (Business Anti-Corruption Portal (GAN), [Referenced 29.11.2016]). That en-
courages the culture of impunity. What makes an act even more difficult to deter-
mine as corruption is that facilitation payments are not mentioned in Ugandan law. 
2.7.2 Financial corruption in universities 
Stone and Starkey (2011) argue that corruption is increasing in universities globally. 
They also say that the corrupt behavior that students adapt in university will follow 
them later on in personal life and in business world. From their own experience, they 
found out that lecturers were demanding additional fees from students for personal 
tuition. From postgraduates it was observed that they even asked the lecturers to 
write their theses.  
Stone and Starkey (2011) found out, from researching literature from this topic, that 
the pressure that students face to pass exams with good results led them to bribe 
the lecturers. Also the probability for a student to become fraudulent was linked to 
higher education. 
Looking at the staff in universities, Stone and Starkey (2011) discovered that regis-
trars were taking bribes from applicants whose credit units and results were not 
sufficient. This was done so the students could initiate studies nevertheless. In these 
cases, parents are also usually involved. Family from the elite level wants to main-
tain their reputation by buying degrees for their children. During the studies staff can 
take bribes from student, so they would do falsification on student’s data. Staff that 
handles payroll can create ghost workers and pay the salaries of those ghosts to 
his/her own account. 
The main problem for corruption was argued by Stone and Starkey (2011) to be the 
commercialized universities. Those universities depend highly on student fees and 
grants from various organizations. Skimming the research funds is one tactic that in 
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a concealed way, moves those funds to the researchers and supervisors own per-
sonal use. 
Business Anti-Corruption Portal (GAN) [Referenced 29.11.2016] explains that cor-
ruption is widespread among public sector. This is because the registry and licens-
ing services are not well organized. The people paying bribes will get services faster. 
This service sector is ranked the sixth most corrupt institution in Uganda. This has 
straight impact on starting businesses, which is necessary to improve Uganda’s in-
frastructure.  
Another way to get more funds, Stone and Starkey (2011) found, was through gov-
ernment funding. It is done by having close relationships between the university’s 
senior management and government committees. This kind of lobbing helps the 
whole university to get more capital. 
2.8 Anti-Corruption Act of Uganda 
The main points in the law concerning organizational fraud in Uganda are presented 
below. These chapters focus mainly on the corrupt or fraudulent acts of officials. 
Below is a chart of penalties and the maximum penalty given from each wrongdoing. 
 
Figure 1. The highest penalties for fraudulent acts. 
 
 
1440
1360
1440 1440
0
400
800
1200
1600
False accounting
by public officer
Fraudulent false
accounting
False claims by
officials
False certificates
by public officers
1 000 UGX
19 
 
 
2.8.1 False accounting by public officer in Uganda 
Anti-Corruption Act of Uganda, part II, section 22. indicates the following: 
A person who, being an officer charged with the receipt, custody or 
management of any part of the public revenue or property, knowingly 
furnishes any false statement or return of money or property received 
by him or her or entrusted to his or her care, or of any balance of money 
or property in his or her possession or under his or her control, commits 
an offence. 
The punishment of the conviction is imprisonment not exceeding three years or a 
fine not exceeding seventy-two currency points. One currency point is 20 000 Ugan-
dan shillings. In euros this means 379 €. 
2.8.2 Fraudulent false accounting in Uganda 
These following actions are indicated as accounting defraud in the Anti-Corruption 
Act of Uganda, part II, section 23.: 
□ destroys, alters, mutilates or falsifies any book, document, valuable secu-
rity or account which belongs to or is in the possession of his or her em-
ployer, or has been received by him or her on account of his or her em-
ployer, or entry in that book, document or account, or is privy to any such 
act; 
□ makes, or is privy to making, any false entry in any book, document or ac-
count; or 
□ omits or is privy to omitting, any material particular from any such book, 
document or account 
The punishment of the conviction is imprisonment not exceeding seven years or a 
fine not exceeding one hundred and sixty-eight currency points. One currency point 
is 20 000 Ugandan shillings. In euros this means 884 €. 
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2.8.3 False claims by officials in Uganda 
Anti-Corruption Act of Uganda, part II, section 24. indicates the following: 
A person who, being employed in the public service in such a capacity 
as to require him or her or to enable him or her to furnish returns or 
statements touching any sum payable or claimed to be payable to him-
self or herself or to any other person, or touching any other matter re-
quired to be certified for the purpose of any payment of money or deliv-
ery of goods to be made to any person, makes a return or statement 
touching any matter which is to his or her knowledge, false in any ma-
terial particular commits an offence. 
The punishment of the conviction is imprisonment not exceeding three years or a 
fine not exceeding seventy-two currency points. One currency point is 20 000 Ugan-
dan shillings. In euros this means 379 €. 
2.8.4 False certificates by public officers in Uganda 
Anti-Corruption Act of Uganda, part II, section 25. indicates the following: 
A person who, being authorized or required by law to give a certificate 
touching a matter that may affect or prejudice the rights of any person, 
gives a certificate which is, to his or her knowledge, false in any material 
particular, commits an offence. 
The punishment of the conviction is imprisonment not exceeding three years or a 
fine not exceeding seventy-two currency points. One currency point is 20 000 Ugan-
dan shillings. In euros this means 379 €. 
2.9 What makes a good fraudster? 
Perri and Brody (2012) found out through their study that there is endless amount 
of tactics to abrogate skepticism towards the offender. Fraudster uses persuasion 
and different techniques to influence the victim. For higher status defrauders’ au-
thority is one way to cone people. For instance, a lecturer can demand student to 
give bribe. The student might feel like she/he must do it, because she/he feels that 
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the lecturer has the control. Also identical characteristics can create trust between 
the fraudster and the victim. Violent behavior at specific points can manipulate 
weaker victims. Even psychopathic traits and narcissistic behavior can be seen on 
some white-collar criminals. 
Gee (2012, 9) identifies anomalies that fraud inspector or management should ob-
serve. Outliers are people who have fallen out from the system. For instance, em-
ployees who start to separate themselves from the rest of the work group. Also the 
opposite, inlier is someone who is trying to get to the group where he/she does not 
belong to. 
Midkiff (2004) provided a checklist for NPO’s that shows the employer what signs to 
look from the employee and the work environment, that might indicate that the em-
ployee is planning to embezzle funds. They are presented below. 
□ Budget cutbacks 
□ High turnover 
□ Refusal to take legitimate fringe benefits 
□ Overhighlight on short-term fund-raising goals 
□ Poor monitoring in a remote event or promotional locations 
□ Bounced cheques 
□ Things do not add up 
□ Hotline tips 
□ Lifestyle or attitude changes 
□ Inattention to details 
□ Not conducting background checks on people responsible of money han-
deling 
□ Keeping issues secret 
□ Unsuccessful to investigate and then prosecute to the fullest extent of the 
law 
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2.10 Prevention of fraud 
This section goes through the causes for fraud, methods to mitigate and avoid fraud-
ulent acts and supporting organizations. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
is the main organization in fraud research. Fraud affects the reputability, legitimacy 
and profitability of the entity. To understand the circumstances where fraud takes 
place, fraud triangle is presented. Finally, corporate governance and internal control 
are discussed to show subjects to develop. 
2.10.1 Learning about fraud in the organization 
In 1996 KPMG, an auditing company, made a survey regarding fraud in entities of 
South Africa. They discovered that 66 percent of the respondents had previously 
experienced fraud. Looking at the future they asked if the companies’ management 
thought if fraudulent acts would increase or decrease. Shockingly 88 percent replied 
that it would most likely increase. Survey still continued with the question of why do 
they think fraud happens in the organizations? Respondents could not give any rea-
sons for it and instead they could only show methods of detection and ways to miti-
gate circumstances where fraud occurred. 
Fraud is deleterious especially in developing regions like the countries of Africa 
(Rossouw, Mulder & Barkhuysen, 2000). Fraud has created a cycle whereby the 
lack of shareholder trust on the financial status as well as reputation of the entities, 
makes them unwanted investment subject. This leads to more fraudulent acts to be 
committed because of poor performance. Dee (2012, 10) says that organization 
must understand fraud and update information of the fraud cases in their industry. 
This helps to separate inconsistencies in the business that are acceptable and which 
should be considered as possible fraud.  
Rossouw et. al. (2000) interviewed South-African fraudsters who were imprisoned. 
They were convicted from different types of asset embezzlements. The target was 
to find reasons that motivated and rationalized the act of fraud.  They discovered 
that there were two types of reasoning, self-centered (greed) and other-centered 
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(help someone else). Prisoners also told, that fraud was committed because of pres-
sure (forced) or out of own choice (voluntarily). 
□ Case of self-centered fraud could be for instance, when a person wants to 
make high amounts of money. It is not that the person really needed the 
embezzled amount. 
□ To give an example of other-centered fraud is that someone is trying to 
help the family in a bad financial situation. 
□ A situation of being pressured towards fraud could be when a political sit-
uation unstabilizes the country economics. “Preparing for a rainy day”. 
□ Voluntarily committing fraud can give a person for instance, the thrill of 
coning people and to have control. 
Conclusion was made that there are no simple and straightforward solution or ex-
planation for fraud (Rossouw et. al. 2000). Instead this kind of linear thinking can 
create more opportunities for fraudsters. This is why there has to be a cocktail of 
multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary approaches. 
Vona (2008, 10) indicates that each fraud scheme has variations and those varia-
tions have many scenarios. The industry and the country also give an impact to the 
type of fraud. The data profile of each case is unique. 
Gee (2012, 10) talks about data mining as an effective data analysis tool. Data anal-
ysis means evaluation of data through analytical and logical reasoning. Data mining 
is when there is excessive amount of data, so advanced statistical tools are used to 
find trends, patterns and relationships. The point is not to test hypothesis, meaning 
that no specific result is anticipated. Other tools to use in data analysis are for in-
stance business intelligence, text analytics and data visualizations (p. 10). Through 
these analyzes hypotheses are found. Next step is to do a confirmatory data analy-
sis whereby founded hypotheses are tested to prove or disprove them. Qualitative 
analysis is used audit the controls, procedures and processes. Gee (p. 12) admits 
that data analysis has its risks. Errors might occur and even fraud in the statistics is 
possible if many members have access to modify the data in software. In chapters 
5. – 16. Gee goes through different schemes and which kind of analyzes apply for 
each case. 
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Attewell (2010, 52) argues in his research that statistics could be a way to learn 
about criminal acts. He compares it with the statistical models used in medicine and 
health. By this he means immoral acts from small embezzlement to well-planned 
scams should be compared to factors such as age, gender, profession and location. 
2.10.2 The fraud triangle by ACFE (2016) 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) presents the fraud triangle (2016). 
To commit fraud an ordinary person must be present with three factors: pressure, 
opportunity and rationalization. Vona (2008) argues that each element should be 
identified. This is because at least one of them has the strength to make the de-
frauder commit the act and make him or her not worry about detection. Below is a 
figure of the fraud triangle. 
 
 
Pressure is the first leg that motivates the crime. The individual might be in a situa-
tion where she/he has a financial problem. This leads to the consideration of com-
mitting illegal act. These problems can be divided to personal (for instance debt) or 
professional (e.g., job or business is in jeopardy). 
Second leg is the opportunity. It means that a person has the potential to take ad-
vantage of her/his position of trust. There should also be opportunity to do it in se-
cret. 
 
Figure 2. The fraud triangle. 
Rationalization 
 
Pressure 
 
Opportunity 
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The third leg is rationalization. Fraudsters might make the act more acceptable for 
themselves by thinking that the fraud is done only because of bad set of circum-
stances. Also person who has not had any criminal background can see fraudulent 
act as morally acceptable. They might also try to justify the act in many ways. These 
can be for instance “I was borrowing the money”, “I was entitled to the money”, “I 
am underpaid” or “I had to provide for my family”. 
2.10.3 Dimensions to fraud by Coleman (1989) 
Coleman (1989) gave another three dimensions to explain why a person commits a 
fraudulent act. They are motive, opportunity and lack of feelings of guilt. He says 
that the motive to commit fraud should be more significant than the punishment from 
the wrongdoing. Opportunity is also mentioned in his theory. In addition, he gives 
three factors to it. Firstly, the fraudster has to have trust or access to persons in 
position of trust. Secondly, the fraudster has to have a higher understanding of the 
control systems in the organization. Thirdly, the fraudster should have access to the 
entity’s assets. The last dimension is psychological. There should not be guilt that 
would deter the fraudster to commit the immoral act. Here Coleman mentions ra-
tionalization as a way to rid themselves of from the feeling of guilt. 
Comparing Coleman’s (1989) and the more current researchers’ opinions of fraud, 
the difference comes in the fact that Coleman does not see corruption as a form of 
fraud. This is why his dimensions to fraud does not apply to corruption. It can be 
seen for instance, that Biegelman’s and Bartow’s (2006, 27) definition of fraud is 
always connected with ACFE’s fraud triangle. 
2.10.4 Managerial honesty 
Clor-proell, Kaplan and Proell (2015) made an experiment on managerial honesty 
by testing undergraduate and graduate students. Researchers gave two tasks, mak-
ing a recommendation and reporting the cost. Students were divided into owners 
and employees. Hypothesis was tested only on to the employees. They tested if the 
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employees choose to report costs higher which would give them additional compen-
sation or lower which resulted in lower additional compensation. The impact on the 
owner would be vice versa. 
For instance, if the actual cost was 100 million UGX and employee reported the 
costs as 150 million UGX, employee would retain 50 million on additional compen-
sation. This means the owner would lose 50 million UGX. In reverse, if employee 
would report the costs to be 50 million UGX, she/he would lose 50 million UGX and 
the owner would gain 50 million UGX. 
Clor-proell et al. (2015) tested this in four periods. Each period was created to be 
more and more difficult to reach the target. They also manipulated the students by 
promotion availability. 
Results show that promotion availability has more powerful effect on reducing fraud 
in extremely difficult targets than under easy targets (Clor-proell, et al. 2015). But 
when the owner-students were asked about the fairness they said that difficult tar-
gets were less fair than the easy ones. This research and other studies indicates 
that the use of targets can have negative side effects in organizational settings. To 
continue, the experimentation shows that adding the promotion availability can mit-
igate the risk of fraud. 
It is recommended that researchers should increase their understanding on individ-
uals’ decision making to commit fraud and study settings which promote fraud (Clor-
proell et al. 2015). Individuals personality also influences the decision making. En-
vironmental features like reputation, investigation, isolation can remove or lead to 
fraudulent act. 
2.10.5 The effect of fraudulent act on entity 
Fraud affects vast range of stakeholders consisting of board members, top manag-
ers, employees, auditors, creditors and shareholders (Clor-proell et al. 2015). Clor-
proell et al. (2015) presents in their article, previous research results from Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) who have discovered that respondents of their inquiry for 
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report to the nations on occupational fraud and abuse (2012) estimated annual fi-
nancial losses of 5 percent for “typical organization”. To continue Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (PwC) also discovered in their report Global economic crime survey (2011) 
that 34 percent of respondents for their surveys said that one or more fraud cases 
were reported in their organization. 
Previous years surveys indicate that employee fraud is the most common type (Clor-
proell et al. 2015). Researchers have studied mostly fraudulent financial reporting 
(cooking the books), which is common. Because of that, there has been lack of re-
search on employee fraud. The difference between these two cases are that fraud-
ulent financial reporting creates gains for the whole organization, whilst employee 
fraud benefits only the individual on the expense of the organization. 
Biegelman and Bartow (2006, 26) show statistics of the impact of fraud in the United 
States of America. Lack of confidential reporting mechanisms in an organization 
was shown to have 56 500 $ median financial losses to fraud. Having an anonymous 
reporting hotline would help the institution. This was proved from a study that em-
ployees, customers and vendors would give tips to the organization. 60 percent of 
the tips came from the employees. The amount of fraud loss by management mem-
ber was 14 times more than by an employee. Also the median recovery from the 
losses was only 20 percent and still 40 percent of the organizations did not recover 
anything. 
Greenlee et. al. (2007) found out through surveys that nonprofit organizations lost 
even more assets (median of 100 000 $) due to embezzlement in United States. 
Corruption gave the median losses of 190 000 $. 
2.10.6 Internal control 
Internal control is a leadership and management model, which objective is to help 
the organization to reach its targets (Biegelman & Bartow 2006, 107). They talk 
about the importance of a proper code of conduct or ethics policy which leads the 
organization to be more honest and unified. Biegelman and Bartow (p. 108) explain 
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that the process starts by identifying the possible ways of fraud so the risks can be 
mitigated. 
Kovavich (2008, 29) writes that entity’s policies, procedures and processes must be 
known by the fraudster so the immoral act can be called fraud. A wrongdoer could 
just defend themselves by saying it was a mistake that they did not know. This is 
why it is so important to have adequate internal control and training that this scenario 
can never happen.  
Biegelman and Bartow (2006, 109) argue that a compliance officer is needed in 
larger organizations. They should be in charge of compliance training, establish 
compliance committee, to demonstrate sincere ongoing effort to comply with appli-
cable laws. Compliance officer should develop current policies and procedures to-
wards more enhanced compliance effort. 
Biegelman and Bartow (2006, 111) continue about the importance of due diligence 
and background checks. All major business decisions should be made with due dil-
igence and proper knowledge of the contractual partner with the interest of the or-
ganization in mind. Rae and Subramaniam (2008) found out in their study that poli-
cies on approvals, authorizations, reconciliations, verifications and segregation of 
duties should be planned well and to be strictly followed by the employees. These 
will give the organization a strong internal control base and shows to indicate that 
fraud risk decreases. Organizational justice perceptions need to be build up together 
with the employees (Rae & Subramaniam). There should be open communication 
between different organization members and they need to understand the im-
portance of performance evaluation and rewarding. Any unreasonable pressure 
through unjust processes or unrealistic performance targets should be avoided. Em-
ployees should feel free to notify the management about unfair treatment. 
Biegelman and Bartow (2006, 112) explain the largest pitfalls in standard controls. 
Separation of duties should be clear, for instance a person ordering should not be 
the receiver of the item. This creates a risk of over ordering items for your own per-
sonal use. Inexperienced accountants might not have sufficient understanding of 
dubious business. Problem with roles being not well defined can lead to some tasks 
being neglected or done by a person who has their own personal interest on the 
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case. Lack of coordination with internal audit can lead to the data being valueless. 
There should be a clear process presented on acquisitions and mergers. Again this 
could reflect to the case of duties not being separated. Manual workarounds in ac-
counting create a risk of information being easily altered. 
Individual code of ethics should be created for the organization (Biegelman & Bartow 
2006, 112). This will be a “moral compass” for the members. It should promote eth-
ical issues and integrity. 
Biegelman and Bartow argue that the best way to introduce a culture of compliance 
is through functioning internal control and antifraud program. They represent in their 
book a 14-step program which is provided through The American Institute of Certi-
fied Accountants’ Management Antifraud Programs and Controls (2002). The pro-
gram is designed to detect and prevent fraud. The steps are presented below: 
1. Setting the tone at the top. Directors and officers should provide example 
of ethical behavior. 
2. Creating a positive workplace environment. Studies have shown that 
pleasant work environment has less occurrence of wrongdoing. 
3. Hiring and promoting appropriate employees. There should be a proper 
background check for all the employees and effective policies should be 
put to place. These tools will lower the change of engaging with or upgrad-
ing an unsuitable person who lacks in honesty and trust. 
4. Training. Senior members should be trained regularly as well as new em-
ployees. Induction should include entity’s values and code of conduct. Also 
the duty of reporting fraudulent acts and what are included in those acts 
should be explained to the members. 
5. Confirmation. It should be made clear that all members are held account-
able to act within the code of conduct. 
6. Discipline. The reaction towards incidents of fraudulent acts will give 
strong cautionary message to the whole organization. It should be noticed 
that consequences of committing fraud should be communicated in the in-
duction. Fraudulent acts and the punishments can be shown as a no-name 
example. 
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7. Identifying and measuring fraud risks. The primary responsibility for es-
tablishment and monitoring of fraud risk assessment and prevention activ-
ities is upon the management. The institution should consider their vulner-
ability towards fraudulent activity. 
8. Mitigating fraud risks. Reducing fraud risk can be done by changes in the 
institution’s activities and processes. Situations and acts that create unac-
ceptable risks should be ceased. 
9. Implementing and monitoring appropriate internal controls. After the 
fraud risk assessment has been made, the organization can identify proce-
dures that will mitigate the identified risks. These procedures are for in-
stance processes and controls. Information system should be secured and 
monitoring activities should be put to place. These will make the internal 
control more effective. 
10. Audit Committee. This board should look at the effectiveness on identifi-
cation of fraud risks by the management. Then they should assess imple-
mentation of antifraud program. This is viewed from the point of employees 
as well as management. Lastly the focus should be on creation of the tone 
at the top.  
11. Management. Previously discussed monitoring processes and controls 
should be implemented by the management. Management can also partic-
ipate in fraudulent act. If this is a high risk, audit committee should perform 
the monitoring processes and controls of senior management. 
12. Internal Auditors. Internal auditors are not obliged by the law but they can 
be highly valuable in overseeing the organizations operations. They work 
as detectives of fraud as well as deterrence measure. 
13. Independent Auditors. Independent auditors can provide impartial as-
sessment of the entity’s process for identifying, assessing and responding 
to the risks of fraud. There should be an open dialogue between them, audit 
committee and board of directors. 
14. Certified fraud examiners. A larger scale organization with many sectors, 
has a need for third party to assist audit committee and board of directors. 
Certified fraud examiners have extensive knowledge and specific experi-
ence about fraud. This expertise might not be available elsewhere within 
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the entity. They can advise on the risks and resolve allegations or suspi-
cions of fraud. 
2.10.7 Corporate governance 
Biegelman and Bartow (2006, 44) talk about corporate governance as a system 
between management and all the other interested parties. A system that checks and 
balances with the aim of generating an effective, efficient and law complying entity. 
2.10.8 Association of Certified Fraud examiners (ACFE) 
ACFE is the largest anti-fraud organization in the world (Association of Certified 
Fraud examiners (ACFE) [Referenced 7.1.2016]). It is located in USA and provides 
anti-fraud training and education. Members are entities and people with experience 
in the field. ACFE gives qualifications for Certified Fraud Examiners (CFE). They 
promote integrity, objectivity and professionalism. 
2.10.9 The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) 
For entities to adapt compliance, accountability and ethical conduct, an organization 
has been initiated to assist. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) (2016) brings together five private sector institu-
tions and associations. They are American Accounting Association, Financial Exec-
utives International (FEI). The Association of Accountants and Financial Profession-
als in Business (IMA) and The Institute of Internal Auditors. Together they provide 
guidance and development on enterprise risk management, internal control and 
fraud deterrence. They produce guides and articles that entities can purchase. For 
instance, in 2012 they released guide for risk assessment and 2016 a fraud risk 
management guide. 
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2.10.10 Fraud risk assessment 
ACFE provides a fraud prevention check-up test [Referenced 28.12.2016], which 
shows the organization’s level of fraud risk. After the test is done, any score under 
100 indicates that there is a lack in fraud prevention processes. In the worst-case 
scenario, these gaps could cause even legal problems so they should be fixed im-
mediately. 
Gee (2012, 5) gives a formula for risk. Risk = Impact x Probability. This means that 
risk assessment should compare the threats and vulnerabilities. These two neces-
sarily do not go hand in hand. Threat might be high but the vulnerability low, so a 
company might not respond to the risk if for instance the way to mitigate risk causes 
more costs than the fraud creates or the likeliness of the fraud is low. 
Looking at Coleman’s (1989) dimensions to fraud, it suggests three “avenues” to 
fight fraud. One is to subvert the motivation for fraud. Next thing to tackle is how to 
diminish the opportunities for committing fraud. And finally, how to invoke those feel-
ings of guilt towards the fraudulent act. 
A periodic fraud risk assessment should be conducted by the management (Biegel-
man and Bartow 2006, 129–130). All levels of the entity should be assessed and 
previous results should be recorded. They argue that only inside evaluation can truly 
measure the organization’s risk of fraud. Three types of risk should be considered 
when conducting a risk assessment. They are presented below. 
□ Financial reporting risk. This is a risk whereby a senior management 
commits an offense or the possibility for fraud in the financial statement. It 
is indicated to be a low-occurring fraud, but devastating when it appears. 
Responsible for reducing this risk are the board, the audit committee and 
internal auditors with the CEO and CFO. 
□ Operational risk means that the entity itself commits fraud by e.g. avoid-
ing taxes or deceiving stakeholders. This is another risk, which the senior 
management is responsible of. 
□ Compliance risk happens through corruption, internal asset misappropri-
ation or external fraud anywhere in the company. This is the most various 
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section, because there are countless ways that the organization can be 
defrauded by the employees or outsiders.  
This thesis focuses on the last risk (compliance). Below is presented the process of 
fraud risk assessment. It indicates the difficulty of compliance risk assessment, be-
cause there are many factors to consider. 
 
Figure 3. Fraud risk assessment objectives (Biegelman & Bartow 2006, 130). 
The fraud risk assessment has three functions, which are identification of fraud risks, 
analysis for their probability and finally the determination of the impact. Examiner 
should look at frauds which affected the business in the past, which are common in 
the industry and geographically prevalently occurring. This is not compliance audit, 
rather it looks at the liability of an entity. The goal of the process is to determine: 
□ possible areas where fraud could take place 
□ the likelihood of fraud 
□ the cost of fraud 
□ the proper corrective measure and the cost for it 
Next are presented methods to rate the likelihood and impact of a fraud risk. 
2.10.11 Quad method 
This is the simplest way to rate the probability of a specific type of fraud (Camgemi 
& Singleton 2003, 71). In a scale of 1 to 10, 1 is highly unlikely, 5 is neutral and 10 
is highly probable. Here the impact and likelihood is rated, which puts the fraud to 
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one of these four boxes (presented below). This can be used in five areas of an 
entity: sales and collection, purchasing and payments, inventory and warehousing, 
payroll and expenses or financial statement reporting. Appendix 1. shows a hypo-
thetical example of this method. Below is a figure with the explanations for each 
Quad. 
 
Figure 4. Quad method (Camgemi & Singleton 2003, 71). 
 
The Quad method is criticized, because of its’ simplicity (Biegelman & Bartow, 134–
135). Appendix 1. has an example of quad method. Considering appendix 1. the 
frauds 3. and 6. are not so far apart so that the other should have a higher priority. 
Also, it should be questioned that should 1. and 6. be prioritized the same. 
2.10.12 The staggered box method 
The issues rising from quad method can be corrected through replacing quadrants 
with a staggered chart (Biegelman & Bartow 2006, 135–136). It has 25 boxes with 
four shades that represent levels of risk. The difference is that these are not pre-
sented in squares, shown in appendix 2. Looking at the box in upper left, the system 
staggers down every two squares. Appendix 2. shows the difference in outcome 
compared to quad method. 
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Using the staggered box method seen in appendix 2., it can be noticed that the 
issues mentioned before with quad method are solved. Now 3. and 6. have the same 
priority and 1. and 6. are in the same column. 
To continue, Biegelman and Bartow (p. 136) argue that there are still some problems 
with 25-box method. Looking at ratings 4 and 5 for impact, there is no absolute 
objective difference between them. Or the probability between 1 and 2? 
2.10.13 The “Chessboard” method 
Biegelman and Bartow (p.136) continue that to answer the questions appearing from 
staggered box method, is to move forward from step to step geometrically rather 
than arithmetically. In business, a person has to acknowledge the pecuniary aspect. 
This is why the frauds should be considered in currency. In Uganda this would be 
10 000 UGX fraud, 100 000 UGX fraud, 1 000 000 UGX fraud and etc. Appendix 3. 
gives an example of “chessboard” method, which corrects all the defectiveness the 
other methods had. 
Looking at the Appendix 3. 10 000 UGX fraud (8f) that happens 100 times a day (1i) 
would cost the organization 300 000 000 UGX. This equals the same as 
100 000 000 UGX fraud (5i) that happens once every 100 days (4f). This means, 
that they should be targeted as equally important. 
In his book, Broder (2000, 24) says that this method makes it easier to estimate the 
risks and find similar influences on different frauds. These can be even brought to-
gether from separate departments. This mitigates the risk of error in the strategy 
while categorizing the frauds by rank. 
2.10.14 Response to fraud risk 
The fraud risk assessment results should receive precise analyzing. After that deci-
sions have to be made (Biegelman and Bartow 2006, 138). Biegelman and Bartow 
give four responses that can preclude the risk: 
36 
 
 
□ Avoid the risk: a total discontinuation of the practice that causes the risk 
□ Transfer the risk: insurance in case of fraudulent act 
□ Accept the risk: no response until the fraud happens 
□ Control the risk: to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, put controls in 
place 
2.10.15 Training as a fraud prevention and detection method 
Biegelman and Bartow (2006, 296) argue that training is an absolute requirement in 
fraud prevention and in the creation of culture of compliance. It should be given to 
the CEO as well as down to every level of organization members. The difference 
becomes noticeable on the length and type of training. 
These trainings could be in a university organization: employee training by the sen-
ior management, experts or professionals guiding the senior members, web-based 
training and special courses or included lessons in the beginning of the studies for 
students. If the organization has their own specialist with certification (certified fraud 
examiner), her/him should have Continuing Professional Education (CPE) given 
each year. The senior management, no matter certified, should have CPE at least 
40 hours per year. This should include 4 to 8 hours of fraud prevention related ma-
terial. 
Biegelman and Bartow (2006, 297) name four main parts of effective fraud aware-
ness training for employees: 
1. The definition of fraud should be simple: fraud is lying, cheating and steal-
ing from the entity. 
2. Talk about the negative impacts fraud creates on the organization’s fi-
nances and reputation. 
3. Show cases of various fraudulent acts that members might discover. These 
could be for instance cheque forgery, skimming the funds, bribery or ghost 
workers. 
4. Give the members clear instructions on how to react to detected fraud. 
37 
 
 
They continue that the training should not be recriminatory but instead factual. This 
should be explained by telling that fraud leads to reducing of raises, jobs, benefits, 
or even salary cuts. Overall morality in the organization and personal integrity will 
deteriorate. 
Kovacich (2008, 35) explains that the training of employees should be as simple as 
possible. A slideshow that has only three pages could be enough. Example is shown 
below. 
1. A summary of the anti-fraud program. 
2. A summary of the definition of what is considered as fraud. This includes 
requirement for the employees to report these acts. 
3. A summary referencing policies and contact persons responsible of fraud 
risk management. 
 
2.11 Detection of fraud 
Greenlee et. al. (2007) found out that nonprofit organizations used mostly external 
auditors (86 %) to find the frauds. Another tactic was to work out who are the key 
employees and bonding with them to get them to operate against fraud (60 %). 
Thirdly used method was the hotline (40 %). The smallest percentage (21 %) of use 
was on background checks. 
Greenlee et. al. (2007) also got answers from the respondents to how they discov-
ered the frauds. 43 percent were coming upon through tips. Employees were report-
ing half of them. Internal audit managed to detect on average only a quarter of those 
frauds. Other to give tips was vendors and customers. It should be noticed that ven-
dors’ tips led to the highest value frauds to be discovered. 22 percent of the fraud 
cases were caught by unintentionally. External auditors helped only to find 12 per-
cent of the frauds. This means that two thirds of frauds were being discovered 
through tips or by accident, which is alarming. 
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Vona (2008) says that there are two fundamental approaches to fraud detection. 
First one is to discover frauds passively by testing the internal control and the sec-
ond is to react to allegations or tips. 
Hubbs (April, 2012) writes in his article about his own experience in the field as fraud 
investigator. Most commonly in his work he comes through cases whereby the em-
bezzlement accompanies with human resource issues, like watching chargeable 
channels that are paid through company-issued credit card that the employee has 
an easy access to. Other cases involve for instance bullying or harassment. He calls 
these workplace deviant behaviors. These acts violate company policies, laws and 
socially acceptable workplace behaviors. He argues that discovering these behav-
iors could lead to fraudulent acts. 
In another article from Hubbs (August, 2012) discusses about fraud brainstorming. 
This means that the audit team tries to think like a fraudster. They should also learn 
the processes in the organization to understand where the frauds could be found. 
He argues that too many auditors just state in their audit plan that "the audit staff 
will remain vigilant for fraud during the course of the audit". This means that in most 
cases they are just simply being lucky if they discover fraud. But he continues by 
admitting that finding fraud is challenging. Brainstorming should only include the 
audit team, not the CEO or other senior management. This is because they might 
leak information or be corrupted themselves. For fraud brainstorming he gives a list 
that should be followed: 
1. Gathering the right people (confidentiality) 
2. Evaluating the processes 
3. Players (employees, management, stakeholders, etc.) 
4. Information and environment 
5. Creating possible fraud schemes 
6. Generating audit procedures build on to the schemes 
7. Developing fraud triggers 
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2.11.1 Statements on Auditing Standards No. 99 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) released SAS No. 
99 in 2002. It is called Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. It was 
established to guide auditors’ in executing that obligation of getting reasonable as-
surance on whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, 
whether caused by error or fraud. In practice this means external auditors need to 
have greater involvement. In 2002 SAS 99 superseded SAS 82, which meant that 
auditors got improved tools and guidance for effective fraud detection. However, 
SAS 99 focuses mainly on financial statement fraud. 
SAS 99 (2002) includes description and characteristics of fraud. It explains the value 
of professional skepticism. It indicates the risks of material misstatement because 
of fraud. It demands the consideration of fraud risk factors. Identification of risks that 
may lead to material misstatement because of fraud should be considered. These 
risks should be then assessed and taken into account in the programs and controls. 
After that a response to the results are required. When the audit has been done, the 
evidence should be evaluated. If possible fraud is detected it should be communi-
cated at least to the management and the audit committee. Finally, the consideration 
of fraud by the auditor’s must be documented. 
2.11.2 What to look for from the records 
Gee (2012, 9) gives a list of red flags to look for. A clear sign is if the amount of 
transactions differs negatively as well as positively from the normal. Unreasonable 
or unexplained items occur in the list of goods or sales charts. There should be 
supervision over unusual relationships between items and unexpected timing of 
transactions. Items should be numbered and they should be sequential. Any gaps 
or duplicates must be checked. Any payment methods that differ from the normal 
should raise up questions. Any other inconsistency should also be evaluated. 
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2.12 How to deal with committed fraud 
If it still happens that fraud is carried out, every organization should design a per-
sonal plan on how to react on different types of frauds committed by different organ-
ization members. 
Trevino (1992) studied the theories of social effects of punishment. She says in her 
article that punishments will shape the perceptions of the entity as just or unjust. 
Penalty was shown to work as an example to other individuals when the punishment 
target had similar characteristics with them. Certainty and severity are both im-
portant factors of punishments to reduce the likelihood of misconduct. Another de-
terrence can come from the other group members. Negative effect on relationships 
and loss of status or respect can inhibit fraudulent behavior. Informal sanctions were 
shown to have 2 ½ times greater impact than formal. Informal sanctions meant in 
this case for example, gossip and ridicule. The problem with informal sanction is that 
it can only happen if the group members see the act of the fraudster as a violation. 
Greenlee et. al. (2007) asked nonprofit organizations about how they deal with the 
perpetrators. The options were criminally or civilly. 72 percent said that they fired 
the person and 7 % had no consequences. To compare, for-profit organizations 
terminated 88 % and gave no punishment in 6.5 percent of the cases. These cases 
of no later sanctions meant, that the perpetrator would disappear, quit or (less likely) 
was forgiven. It was shown to be more common to give a criminal prosecution to the 
larger scales’ frauds (median of 140 000 $). Still only 70 percent of those fraudsters 
were found guilty. Mostly this was due to lack of evidence. Finally, they asked from 
the respondents what percentage of the loss was recovered. Here they discovered 
that only 34 percent recovered the entire amount and 50 percent recovered abso-
lutely nothing. This indicates that the median loss was 25 350 $. Entities having 
insurance recovered 57 percent of the loss. 
Barra (2010) carried out a study on which method will have a greater effect on re-
ducing fraud, penalties or tightened internal controls. She found out through this 
study that utilizing an internal control that incorporates separation of duties will in-
crease the cost of committing fraud for the employee. This means that employees 
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are less likely to commit fraud. Penalties was shown to have no impact on the like-
liness of committing fraud. If penalties are used, they should be lower for the em-
ployees than for the management members. Different penalties are put to place to 
set a fair example in the organization. 
Members of the organization are divided into two groups, managerial and non-man-
agerial members. Barra (2010) also weighted the impact of collusion. Collusion is a 
factor that makes the implementation of internal control and giving penalties chal-
lenging. For instance, a management member and an internal auditor (non-mana-
gerial member) can work together. Thereby the internal auditor covers up the man-
ager’s actions. Greenlee et. al. (2007) discovered that 18.6 % of frauds in organiza-
tions were involving collusion. The median loss through this kind of fraud was 4 
times more than perpetrated by a single individual. 
Herath and Rao (2009) discovered that that certainty of detection of fraud was a 
stronger deterrent than severity of punishment. In the matter of fact punishments 
seemed to have a negative effect on the behavior of entity members. This indicates 
again that internal control should be developed to the fullest capacity. 
Robinson (2008, 67) warns about the risk of “making an example”. Entity might give 
greater punishment for an individual to illustrate other members what could come 
about from fraudulent act. Problem with this approach is that the entity might give a 
bad image to the employees through penalty that is seen unfear. Otherwise the em-
ployees could see that this greater penalty is given only once as an example. An-
other issue is following the same line of harsh punishments. Looking at the possible 
fraudster, it can be seen that knowing about the extreme punishments would not 
remove any of the fraud triangles’ three legs of pressure, rationalization and oppor-
tunity. Instead it could even make it more rational in the eyes of the fraudster. Rob-
inson (2008, 67) explains that the consistency of penalties would set better image 
on how the entity tackles fraud. 
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3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section goes through the methods that were used in this research. After that 
the replies from the interview are presented. Last to conclude is the comparison of 
findings through the interview and theory. 
3.1 Methods 
This thesis will be made mostly by using qualitative research. Sharan (2014, 3) ex-
plains qualitative research to be a way to uncover the meaning of a phenomenon. It 
is a type of analysis that includes philosophical orientations and approaches 
(Sharan, 19). All qualitative study is interpretive (Sharan, 22). It is divided in two 
main terms qualitative research and qualitative inquiry (Sharan, 21). Sharan contin-
ues that qualitative research can be divided still in many ways. Patton (2002) breaks 
them still to 16 theoretical traditions while for example Cresswell (2007) presented 
five approaches. Those five approaches are narrative research, phenomenology, 
grounded theory, ethnography and case study. 
The division of Cresswell (2007) into five approaches will be used in this thesis. 
Narrative research gives a timeline where you can see the escalation that leads to 
fraud. Phenomenology will show that people understand the morality of fraudulent 
act differently. Grounded theory will be used to argue against or for the findings from 
the literature research. The strategy of ethnography gives an explanation why peo-
ple act the way they do in the setting where they are. For example, the types and 
amounts of fraudulent acts differs a lot in Finland and Uganda. Thesis research will 
include a case study in a form of an interview where different kinds of members from 
the university will be asked various questions. These members will be lecturers, 
students and finance department personnel. These interviews will give a compre-
hensive view of the phenomenon. 
Quantitative analysis will be needed to indicate how misappropriation will have an 
impact on the financial status of the company. 
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The data for this thesis will be collected by going through scientific research, articles, 
and books, which talk about fraud and some studies that concentrate on developing 
countries.  Furthermore, the causes that leads to false acts will be examined. Based 
on different organizations members’ experiences, the thesis will include a 
comparison between them and the collected data from theliterature search. 
3.2 Interviews 
Interviews were carried out in a commercialized university. Appendix 4 has the list 
of questions given to the interviewees. Different organization members were inter-
viewed, including students, payroll clerks and internal auditor. Bachelor level stu-
dents were interviewed in one group that had 17 students. The interview was carried 
out by the thesis writer giving a question and then opening a discussion. Payroll 
clerks were three and they were interviewed similarly with open discussion between 
people. Last interview with the internal auditor was one on one whereby the auditor 
replied straight to the questions. 
Questions were specified and some were left out in the interviews of students. This 
was because the students were not from the field of business administration and the 
form of the questions were intended to be more professional. 
Answers and opinions differed highly between the members. Also to be noticed was 
that literature research indicated higher risk of fraud in commercialized universities 
while interviewees where not agreeing with this assumption. Similarly the topic of 
penalties had dissenting opinions. 
Existence of fraud in the institution and implementation of fraud risk manage-
ment 
All the members agreed that fraud does happen in the organization and that the 
strategy for fraud risk management was not put to place. Some changes had been 
made in the organization, for instance more strict guidelines that must be followed, 
a fraud hotline and background checks for new members. 
Level of internal control 
44 
 
 
Internal control was told to be developing because the university is still quite young, 
though the members rated it to be 4/5. Internal control includes all the actions men-
tioned in question 6. There are also weekly checks on procurement. 
Transparency and level of communication 
Transparency of the organization was rated on average 2/5 among the students, 
internal auditor gave 3/5 and payroll said on average 4/5. These big differences 
raise a question that is there open communication in the organization. 
The use of programs and controls checkup test 
The 14-step program from AICPA has not been used but internal auditor mentioned 
it will be used to help build up the fraud risk strategy and that it is a useful method. 
The responsibility of fraud prevention and detection was said to be on the vice chan-
cellor by the students, payroll said it is the internal auditor but there should be a 
separate officer in charge of minimizing fraud risk. Internal auditor said that senior 
management is responsible and they delegate tasks to internal audit department. 
Reasons for fraudulent act through morality and the cultural aspect 
Talking about the moral and cultural aspect of fraudulent acts everybody agreed 
that it is not acceptable in any case or that it is cultural. To be noticed was that 
looking at social classes in most cases fraudsters were from middle or upper class. 
This indicates that creed is one main factor pushing towards fraud. Other factors 
they mentioned were low income, lack of transparency, non-independent audit de-
partment, organizational structure, weak controls, opportunity, rationalization, pov-
erty. 
Commercialized universities’ level of fraud compared to government institu-
tions 
Interestingly all the members said that commercialized universities were not experi-
encing as much fraud as government owned. This they explained by that the owner 
of the university is trying to make profits so the need of exterminating fraud is higher, 
whilst government owned organizations have fraud in all levels of the organization 
structure. Also internal control is highly lacking. In the previous research made in 
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United Kingdom that indicated commercialized universities have higher need of 
funding from sponsors which creates pressure to forge results etc. In Uganda the 
situation is different because most of the funding comes straight from study fees. 
Identified cases of fraud 
Students said that bribery exists in the university but the other members did not have 
information on it. Again this is an indication that the communication is not open and 
there is a lack in transparency. Internal auditor told that there have been fraud cases 
of embezzlement, cheque frauds, close relationships between government officials 
and senior management and nepotism. For nepotism, internal auditor gave an ex-
ample of choosing suppliers that are relatives or friends rather than the most afford-
able offer. Between there bribes can be given. Payroll staff could not mention any 
fraud cases. 
Penalties and other correcting actions 
Penalties are mentioned to students but they said those are rare and even the pun-
ishments can be avoided through bribes. All the members still thought that penalties 
are a good example for others. Internal auditor said training and transparency are 
better ways to prevent fraud. All the members agreed that there should be more 
resources to fraud prevention because it would still be less costly than the finances 
lost to fraud. The other ways fraud affects the organization was said to be lack of 
stakeholder trust, change in image and for example management can silence em-
ployees or the trust between staff will affect the relationships. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
Comparing the literature research and the interview data, they show large differ-
ences. Main disagreement comes between Stone’s and Starkey’s (2011) argument 
on commercialized universities being more corrupt. This is due to the fact that their 
research was carried out in developed country (UK) so that must be remembered 
while comparing to Uganda which is still developing. 
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It is still questionable that would the programs and tools given by antifraud organi-
zations in developed countries work in Uganda, where fraud is still carried out mostly 
by embezzling tangible assets and giving bribes. Also, the ring of people committing 
fraud together can be wide and include different organization members. Surprisingly 
very few of the previously mentioned fraud cases had been committed in this uni-
versity. 
Barra’s (2010) research on penalties for fraud was shown to have no impact on the 
likeliness of fraud. Interviewees said that penalty is a good method to prevent fraud 
by setting an example to others. Students added that even the penalties can include 
bribery to reduce them. 
Fines given in Uganda seems unfear. For a big international corporation paying this 
amount is a minor punishment. Looking at a small company owner this could be 
equivalent to turnover of multiple months. In many cases companies will put the 
blame on the accountant when both of the counterparts were working together for a 
goal of embezzling assets. 
Interviewed university seemed to lack in antifraud planning. This process should be 
started immediately by creating fraud risk strategy and then making sure it is 
properly implemented. At the moment, different interviewees were giving broad an-
swers that were not agreeing with each other’s. This organization has already de-
cided to put resources on fraud prevention and detection. SAS No. 99 is being 
properly followed by having segregation of duties and authorizations which are 
checked weekly. 
Effective fraud prevention and detection strategy will help the whole entity financially 
as well as bringing closer the members. It will make the trust of stakeholders 
stronger. 
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4 SUMMARY 
Fraud is defined as disguising or dishonest representation through a statement or 
conduct that infringes another who relies on it in acting. 
This thesis was made to describe fraud and the scope of it. This includes definition 
of fraud and related terms, detection and prevention tactics along with supporting 
organizations. Through this assignment, the university can start the program of anti-
fraud management. 
Anti-fraud management includes fraud risk assessment through which the organi-
zation can create a fraud risk strategy. The objective is to at least mitigate or even 
eliminate the risk of fraud. Using different data analysis tools the management or 
audit department can profile fraudsters and situation where deception might take 
place. Internal control and code of conduct are developed by using the collected 
data. Separation of duties is an important part of the planning and collusion should 
be taken into account. Fraud training is a vital part to ensure that members work 
together to mitigate fraudulent acts. Profiling applicants is important to prevent un-
reliable members to enter the organization. 
It is agreeable that commercialized universities create an opportunity for the staff 
and students to commit fraud. Funds and grants are moving in the organization, so 
without proper control and separation of duties it is possible. Through the interview, 
it was seen that government universities still had more fraud, because of lack of 
control.  
The purpose of antifraud planning is to create trust for stakeholders, perform 
stronger financially and improve togetherness between the various organization 
members. The fraud risk strategy should be based on the 14-step antifraud program. 
Dealing with committed fraud, should be assessed for each case separately. Global 
research indicates that tightening internal control seems to be more effective than 
giving punishments. In contrary the interviewees expressed stronger trust on penal-
ties. Someone could argue that tackling fraud takes too much resources and it is 
impossible to entirely abolish fraud, but previous studies indicates that it is more 
affordable than allowing defrauders succeed.  
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APPENDIX 1: Quad method example 
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This exhibit shows, with their X and Y values charted, hypothetical examples of 
frauds. 
1. Ordering for personal use. (likelihood 5, impact 7) 
2. Falsifying deposit slips. (likelihood 6, impact 10) 
3. Thefts from petty cash. (likelihood 5, impact 5) 
4. Bribes from students to lecturers. (likelihood 7, impact 3) 
5. Skimming research funds. (likelihood 8, impact 9) 
6. Ghost workers. (likelihood 6, impact 5) 
7. Falsification of financial figures. (likelihood 5, impact 2) 
8. Kickbacks. (likelihood 1, impact 2) 
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APPENDIX 2: Staggered box method example 
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APPENDIX 3. Chessboard method. 
To give an example of chessboard method, the impact (i) of fraud is divided to: 
□ 1i = 10 000 UGX 
□ 2i = 100 000 UGX 
□ 3i = 1 000 000 UGX 
□ 4i = 10 000 000 UGX 
□ 5i = 100 000 000 UGX 
□ 6i = 1 000 000 000 UGX 
□ 7i = 10 000 000 000 UGX 
□ 8i = 100 000 000 000 UGX 
Then the frequency (f): 
□ 1f = one time in 300 years 
□ 2f = one time in 30 years 
□ 3f = one time in 3 years 
□ 4f = one time in 100 days 
□ 5f = one time in 10 days 
□ 6f = one time per day 
□ 7f = ten times per day 
□ 8f = 100 times per day 
Now it is possible to calculate the Annual Loss expectancy (ALE) of each type of 
fraud. It is shown on a “chessboard” grid of 64 squares.  
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APPENDIX 4. Occupational fraud and abuse classification system 
   
Figure. Occupational fraud and abuse classification system (ACFE 2016). 
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APPENDIX 4. Interview questions 
1. Have you ever experienced fraud or misappropriation in the organization? 
 
2. Do you have fraud risk strategy in the organization? 
 
• Has it been: 
i. Written 
ii. Presented 
iii. Verbally 
iv. Training 
v. Meeting 
vi. Booklet 
vii. Online 
 
3. If yes, how has it been implemented? 
 
• Changes in guidelines 
• Transparency 
• Punishments 
• Reporting of actions (hotline) 
• Internal control 
• Organization ethics (code of conduct) 
• Organization structure 
• Fraud risk assessment 
• Background checks 
• Something else, what? 
 
4. Internal control is a leadership- and management model, which objective is 
to help the organization to reach its targets. Does your organization have an 
effective internal control? What kind of substantial/concrete changes has it 
given? 
 
5. Rate it from 1 to 5. Five being that organization has proper strategy, imple-
mentation has been put to place and results are noticeable. Comments? 
 
6. Are these actions being followed in the organization? 
 
• approvals, authorizations, reconciliations, verifications and segrega-
tion of duties 
 
7. Is there open communication in the organization? Can employees report for 
instance, unfair treatment? 
 
8. Has the 14-step program provided by The American Institute of Certified 
Accountants’ Management Antifraud Programs and Controls been taken 
place? 
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9. Is fraud in any case morally acceptable? “I was borrowing the money”, “I 
was entitled to the money”, “I am underpaid” or “I had to provide for my fam-
ily” 
 
10. Is fraud culturally acceptable? Or is there a difference in social classes? 
 
11. Who is responsible on fraud prevention and detection in university organi-
zation? 
 
12. Is bribery common in your university? 
 
13. How would you rate the transparency of the organization from 1 to 5? Five 
being that there are no suspicious/hidden actions being done. 
 
14. Have you ever heard of cases of fraud in the entity? 
 
• ghost workers, skimming research funds, close relationships be-
tween university’s senior management and government commit-
tees… 
• cheque-, card-, deposit slip-, receipt frauds 
• false accounting 
• exploiting assets 
• Something else, what? 
 
15.  What are the main reasons leading towards fraud? 
 
• commercialized universities 
• risk of unemployment 
• Low income 
• Creed 
• Opportunity 
• “Small theft” 
• Transparency 
• Non-independent audit department 
• Complex organizational structure 
• Lack of control 
• Something else 
 
16. Are there any penalties mentioned or given? 
• Do you think they are useful? If not, what would be a better option? 
 
17. What is your view on the issue of that fraud prevention takes time and re-
sources? 
 
18. How does fraud affect the organization? (work environment, relationships, 
finances) 
